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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

ANDY VERCIMAK,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
7295

ADAM OSTOICH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIE·F

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, who is his uncle (Tr. p. 55) to recover $500.00 for
labor in connection with the construction and remodeling
of certain premises known as the Horseshoe Inn at 4136
South State Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and for the sum of $7,500.00, alleging the same to be
one-half the reasonable value of the business of said
parties, and for an accounting (Tr. p. 9).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

It is alleged in plaintiff's first amended complaint
that on or about November 1, 1947 plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement of partnership for the operating and conducting of a business at said Horseshoe
Inn, and that under the terms thereof defendant agreed
to furnish the real property and building premises
necessary, together with all fixtures and equipment and
that plaintiff should contribute $100.00 a month during
the term of said partnership; that the if)artners own an
equal interest therein and were to share alike in the
profits and management of said business; that on the
12th day of February, 1948 defendant told plaintiff that
the partnership was at an end and not to come upon
the premises. It is further alleged that the defendant,
because he would not enter into a written memorandum
or partnership agreement, and because of the conduct
above mentioned, had breached the partnership agreement; that defendant refused to settle with him for the
profits· and for damage resulting to the plaintiff by defendant's breach of the partnership agreement, except
that the defendant paid to plaintiff plaintiff's share of
the profits earned from said business to and including
the 12th day of February, 1948 in the sum of $318.79.
Defendant, in his answer, admitted that he refused
to sign a written partnership agreement, but denied the
other allegations in plaintiff's complaint and further
alleged that prior to December 13, 1947 it was orally
agreed between the parties that they would conduct a
retail business for the sale of beer and other merchandise incident to said business, and that they each would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contribute $500.00 to the business and that in addition
thereto the defendant would furnish the premises, furnishings and fixtures necessary. He alleges that plaintiff violated the conditions of the oral agreement and
failed to devote his time and energy to the business.
Defendant further alleges that he had expended large
sums of money for the benefit of the business, which
had not been repaid to him, and that on the 12th day of
February, 1948 it was agreed behYeen the parties to
discontinue the business, and that at the request of
plaintiff the inventory of stock and merchandise on hand
was made and plaintiff was paid one-half the value
thereof, together with one-half the amount due and
owing plaintiff as his share of the business, which was
done (Tr. pp. 1:2-13). The affirmative allegations of
the answer were put in issue by plaintiff's reply (Tr.
pp. 15-16).
At the pre-trial the parties agreed that they entered
h .. to a partnership on or about November 1, 1947 for
the purpose of operating the Horseshoe Inn at 4136
South State Street, Salt Lake County, Utah, and that
each contributed the sum of $250.00 as an initial investment for said partnership; that they ceased operating
as a partnership February 12, 1948 and the defendant
paid to plaintiff the sum of $235.18, the plaintiff's share
of the inventory of said business as of that date, and
paid to plaintiff at least one-half of the profits on said
business up to February 12, 1948, being the sum of
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$477.13. The court then stated the disputed issues as
follows:
'' 1. Was there a 'complete settlement of accounts

between the •parties on or about February
12, 1948~
2. If not, what was the reasonable value of the
business as of that date~" (Tr. p. 221).
As heretofore stated, plaintiff is a nephew of defendant, who formerly resided in Rock Springs, Wyoming. Sometime in the fall of 1947 the defendant asked
plaintiff if he would like to go in business with him and
operate a beer tavern, if he could get a license to sell
beer. He replied that he would not want to hazard the
undertaking for a short period but if he could be assured
of at least five years he would be interested (Tr. p. 64).
He also suggested going into the grocery business but
defendant told him he would not be interested in that
(Tr. V· 65). In regard to the terms of the partnership
the plaintiff stated:

"Q. Well, now what were the terms of, according to your conversation?
A. Well, the terms was, we was to-we was to
work equal, put in equal time in the place,
and we was to pay equal share of the expense, and I was to furnish a hundred dollars to offset his furnishings and building.
Q. And how were you to divide

profits~

A. Equally.
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Q. And expenses?
A. Equally." (Tr. pp. 66-67).
Plaintiff testified, after the termination of the partnership and he had been paid his half of the inventory
and profits of the business on February 17, 1948, that
the following took place :
''A. Well, he asked me how much more he owed
me. I says, 'Mr. Ostoich,' I says, 'it isn't
less than $3,000.'

Q. Then what took

place~

A. Well, when I told him that, he just thumbed
his nose at me, and that is all there was to
it." (Tr. p. 70).
The receipts showing the payment for the inventory
and profits were marked, introduced and received in
evidence as Exhibits 1 and 2 respectively (Tr. p. 56).
In January, 1948 plaintiff had his attorney prepare
a proposed partnership agreement (Tr. p. 78), which
was marked Exhibit 3 and admitted in evidence (Tr. p.
81). Plaintiff claims the $3,000.00 for his portion of
the good will of the business (Tr. p. 85).
Concerning the formation of the partnership, the
h rms of the agreement, the termination thereof and the
cause therefor, and the settlement between the parties,
the defendant testified that he had lived in Utah for 24
years and in Salt Lake County for ten (Tr. p. 89). He
and the plaintiff started operating the Horseshoe Inn
sometime around the first of December, 1947. The arSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rangement was that they would share the cost and
profits alike. Defendant owned the furniture, fixtures
and premises, which were never turned over to the partnership nor was a lease given on the premises (Tr. p.
90). The only money paid by the partners to the partnership was $250.00 by each of them about the 12th day
of January, 1948 (Tr. p. 91). On the 12th day of February, 1948 he told plaintiff that the partnership was to
be dissolved ('Tr. p. 91). There were several reasons
why defendant wanted to terminate the partnership.
Plaintiff had been drinking during working hours (Tr.
p. 95) and at numerous times demanded that they tear
out the apartment where defendant and his wife lived
and make it into a dance hall ( Tr. p. 96).
Defendant testified that on the 17th of February
when the accounts were settled plain tiff knew he was
getting more money than he was entitled to and was
anxious to sign the recei pts and accept the money. It
was after plaintiff had signed the receipts that he demanded as damages the sum of $3,000.00. Plaintiff did
not say what his damages were (Tr. p. 94), and when
the witness paid the money on the inventory and profits
he thought the entire matter was settled (Tr. p. 96). On
cross examination defendant testified that when he pre1

pared the receipts he thought that he had made a final
settlement (Tr. p. 106).
Mrs. Ostoich testified that when the settlement was
made that her husband, plaintiff and his wife, were
present, and that the following conversation took place:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Q. Did you hear your husband ask :Mr. Vercimak if he owed him any more money~
A. He asked, he said, 'Andy,' he said, 'it is
okeh, now, I pay you out~' He said, 'Yes,
it is okeh,' and, when he said that, I turned
around and to my niece, I said, 'Dancel, we
owe you anything more~' She said, 'No,
you don't owe me nothing. ' I said, 'Thank
you; I am glad we don't. It is all right.'
(Tr. p. 108).
She also testified concerning the plaintiff drinking
about the premises. ~frs. V ercimak denied that she had
made the statement that they owed nothing to them and
stated that her husband never drank (Tr. p. 112).
In relation to the attempted iproof of the value of
the business or the value of .good will, J·osephine Bowen
testified she was a housewife ( Tr. p. 121) and had visited
the Horseshoe Inn occasionally (Tr. p. 122); that the
business seemed to be a thriving business ( Tr. p. 123) ;
that when she visited there in the evening there were
from five to twenty-five people present (Tr. p. 127).
Plaintiff contended that the net profit per month was
$750.00 (Tr. p. 130), however, upon cross examination,
he admitted that the profit for the month of December
was only $380.00 ( Tr. p. 140). In figuring the income
he took into consideration the money derived from pinball games and the punch boards ( Tr. 'P· 143).
John B. Fairbanks, who was in the novelty business
of selling punch boards, pinball games and slot machines
during December, 1947 and January, 1948, stated that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he visited the Horseshoe Inn many times; that around
New Year's Eve or sometime during the holidays there
was quite a crowd but at other times there were only 4
or 5 people there ('Tr. p. 164). He made most of his
visits in the evening around 9:00 o'clock (Tr. p. 165).
8amuel L. Tedesco, a real estate salesman with
Brockbank Realty Company, testified that he had been
employed as manager of four beer parlors at one time
in Salt Lake City, and that in his opinion any beer
business should sell for about one year's profit (Tr. p.
185). If there was no lease, it would not sell on the
open market for that much (Tr. p. 188), in fact, it would
be a risky purchase and he would not advise a client to
buy on a month to month basis unless he got a very good
buy (Tr. p. 191).
Harold Leonard testified he was the President of
the State Tavern Association and had been such for
nine years; that he had also owned and operated a tavern
where both bottled and draft beer were dispensed (Tr.
p. 196) ; that in his ·9 years of experience he had visited
taverns throughout the State and. seen their operations
and knew what they sold for at different times (Tr. p.
199); that he would not take into consideration any
money derived from punch boards or pinball games in
figuring the net profit of the business ( Tr. p. 200) ; that
if there was no lease and the arrangement for the
premises where it was operated was merely a month to
month tenancy, he had no opinion as to the value of the
business, as no one would want to purchase the same
(Tr. p. 202); that in connection with the Horseshoe Inn,
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if there was no lease and the fixtures were not to be sold,
the business 'vould have no value (Tr. p. 203). In his
opinion, however, if the place had been 01perated for
two months and a lease was available, then he would
consider the good will worth about $1,000.00 (Tr. p. 206).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON
1. 'That the judgment and decree (Tr. p. 30) is
contrary to law and is not supported by the evidence
or by the Findings of Fact or by the Conclusions of Law.

2. That the Conclusions of Law (Tr. p. 29) are not
supported by the evidence or by the Findings of Fact.
3. That Finding of Fact No. 3 (Tr. p. 29) is not
supported by but is contrary to the law and the evidence and, particularly, as the same purports to find that
plaintiff and defendant did not on February 12, 1948
have a complete settlement of accounts and that the
operation of the Horseshoe Inn proved profitable.
4. That Finding of Fact No. 4 (Tr. p. 29) is not
supported by but is contrary to law and the evidence
and, particularly, wherein it is found:

"• * * Defendant wrongfully caused a cessation
of the operations of the partnership on February
12, 1948. That Defendant operated said "Horseshoe Inn" on and immediately afterFebruary 12,
1948, and has continued to 01perate the same to
the present time and to enjoy and profit by the
value of the business and good will thereof which
had been created and built up by the joint efforts
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of the Plaintiff and the Defendant as partners,
and that in addition to the aforesaid profits and
inventory the partnership business as a profitable
going business had other and additional value and
such additional value was reasonably worth the
sum of $1600.00 and of which the Defendant retained the benefit thereof to himself and for which
an accounting by the partners was not had and
distribution not made ·of the same.''
5. The trial court erred in denying defendant's
Motion for a New Trial (Tr. pp. 34, 38).
6. That the amended compJaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendant.
ARGUMENT
All of the assignments of error are considered in
the different arguments, which we group as follows:
1. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS 'TO STATE
A CAUSE OF ACTION.

From a reading of the complaint as a whole it is
difficult to determine upon what theory plaintiff bases
his right of recovery against the defendant. He alleges
that on or about the first of November, 1947 they entered into a partnership agreement and that the defendant agreed to furnish the real property, building and
fixtures. Plaintiff agreed to pay to the defandant $100.00
per month during the term of the 'partnership. There is
no allegation that the real property, building or fixtures
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were to be any part or portion of the assets of the partnership. There is an allegation that by operating the
business at the premises owned by defendant they would
increase in Yalue, and that such increase would be considered as capital owned equally by the partners. It is
further alleged that they agreed to enter into a written
memorandum partnership agreement when convenient.
There is no allegation that the partnership was to continue for any certain period of time. It is further alleged
that they commenced business on the 13th of December,
1947 and that the defendant terminated the partnership
on the 12th day of February, 1948. The plaintiff alleges
that subsequent to the 12th of February, 1948 he made
demand of defendant for his share of the profits and for
damages resulting to pJaintiff by reason of defendant's
breach of the partnership agreement. In accordance
with the allegations of the pleading defendant had a
right to terminate the partnership at any time that he
desired and not be subject to damages.
Section 69-1-28 (1) (b) Utah Code Annotated 1943
provides:
''Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners :
(b) By the express will of any partner
when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified. ''
Under the pleadings there was no dissolution in
contravention of the partnership agreement, therefore,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the plaintiff would not be entitled to damages by reason
of the dissolution.
Section 69-1-35 Utah Code Annotated 1943, reads in
part as follows:
"69-1-35. Rights of Partners to Application of
Partnership Property.
(1) When dissolution is caused in any way,
except in contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner, as against his copartners and
all persons claiming through them in respect of
their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus rupplied to pay in cash the net amount owing
to the respective partners. But if dissolution is
caused by expulsion of a partner, bona fide under
the partnership agreement, and if the . expelled
partner is discharged from all partnership liabilities either by payment or agreement under section 69-1-33 (2), he shall receive in cash only the
net amount due him from the partnership.
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partnership agreement the rights
of the partners shall be as follows:
(a) Each 1partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall have:
1st All the rights specified in paragraph (1)
of this section ; and,
2nd The right as against each partner who
has caused the dissolution wrongfully to damages
for breach of the agreement.''
This would leave to plaintiff merely the right to
have the partnersh]p property applied to the discharge
of its liabilities and the surplus applied to pay in cash
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the net amount owing to the respective parties. Plaintiff
has admitted that he has received the profits earned by
the business to and including the date of its termination,
February 12, 1948, and he does not allege that there
was any other property that should have been divided
between the parties. He does endeavor to allege that by
the two Inonths operation the parties enhanced the value
of the premises of the defendant, created good will and
a business reasonably worth $15,000.00. This allegation,
we contend, is so uncertain and ambiguous that it does
not amount to an allegation of fact upon which the complaint can stand. There is no allegation that there was
a lease of any duration at all upon the ~premises of the
defendant or the equipment owned and furnished by the
defendant. The allegations in paragraph 7 of the amended complaint are merely conclusions of the pleader. Th8
other contention made by the plaintiff is that he is entitled to $500.00 for work in construction and remodeling
the premises. Ther€ is no allegation, however, in the
complaint that defendant agreed to pay said sum or
even a reasonable sum for such services. In fact, there
is no allegation that defendant ·even requested the plaintiff to do the work, and to have a cause of action there
must be either a contract or an implied contract.
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WAS BREACHED BY
THE DEFENDANT.
A partnership of no definite term may be dissolved
by one partner unequivocally bringing notice home to
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the other party that he no longer intends to be a partner.
Gr,aham V'. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 Pac. (2d) 524.
Exhibit No. 3, which was admitted in evidence, was
the proposed written partnership agreement which the
plaintiff had prepared by his own attorney, has no provision in it that the partnership shall have any definite
term. The only provision in that connection states:
''SECOND: As hereinabove mentioned the partnership -commenced on the 13th day of December,
1947, and shall continue until dissolved by the
mutual and voluntary agreement of the parties
or unless sooner dissolved by any act which is a
cause for the dissolution of a partnership as provided under the terms or provisions of the Statutes of the State of Utah, which said Statutes are
commonly referred to as the Uniform Partnership Act.''
On the question of the length of time the partnership
was to remain in existence the plaintiff testified as
follows:

"Q. And you had your attorney, of course, embody in that agreement the understanding
you understood was the partnership agreement, didn't you T
A. Well, it was supposed to be a partnership
agreement, yes.
Q. Well, I mean you had your attorney put in
as you thought the plan that you and Mr.
Ostoich-

A. No, sir, we just had it built up just as partnership agreement should be built up.
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Q. Didn't you tell your attorney how long it
was to exist for, and so forth and so

on~

A. I told him just exactly what Mr. Ostoich told
me." (Tr. p. 79).
There is no question that the defendant unequivocally gave notice to the plaintiff that he no longer
intended to be a partner. The plaintiff testified that on
or about the 12th day of February, 1948, when he went
to pay defendant the $100.00 due each month defendant
stated that he would no longer accept such payments,
that they were through with the partnership and that
plaintiff did not need to come down to open up the place
but to come down and go over the books (Tr. pp. 71-72).
There is no testimony that any act of the defendant
caused the plaintiff to terminate the agreement, even his
failure to sign the written partnership agreement was
not the cause of the termination.
3. THERE WAS A COMPLETE SETTLEMENT AND
SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
As a logical incident to defendant's statement that
the parties were through as partners and that he would
no longer accept the payment of $100.00 a month, and
that the plaintiff should only concern himself with the
closing of the books, the parties prepared and signed the
releases heretofore indicated and there was paid to the
plaintiff by the defendant the sums representing accrued
profits and inventory, all of which constituted as between
the parties a full release and satisfaction.
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4. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS TO
THE VALUE OF THE BUSINESS OR AS TO
'THE VALUE OF THE GOOD WILL OF THE
BUSINESS.
As the court denied plaintiff's right to recover for
the $500.00 plaintiff claimed for labor on repairing and
altering the premises, the only other question that possibly could arise would be what property or assets of
the partnership had not been divided, assuming for the
pu}}pose of argument that the parties had not made a
full and complete settlement between them. By the pretrial stipulation (Tr. p. 221) and Exhibits 1 and 2 plaintiff admitted that he had received one-half of the profits
derived from the said business, and one-half of the value
of the inventory of the stock in trade of the partnership
as of the date of dissolution, February 12, 1948. What
other assets would the partnership own or control~ Plaintiff admitted that the premises and building, furniture
and equipment were owned and belonged to the defendant and that the partnership had no interest therein by
lease-right, title ·or otherwise (Tr. pp. 86, 139). This
l~aves

one other item and only one, that is the good will

of the business and by good will we do not mean nor do
we think it can be claimed that it is the value of the
business as a going concern. The good will of a business
is not the business but is one result springing out of it.

McGowan v. Griffin, 69 Vt. 168, 37 Atl. 298. Good will
exists as property merely as incident to other property
rights and is not susceptible of being owned and disposed
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of separately from the property right to which it is incident. Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 S. (2d) 240.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Los Angeles Gas <f; Electric Corporation v. Railroad
Commission of the State of California, 289 U. S. 287, 77
L. Ed. 1180, points out the difference between the going
value of a business and good will. The court states:
''The going value thus recognized is not to be
confused with good will, in the sense of that 'element of value which inheres in the fixed and
favorable consideration of customers, arising
from an established and well-known and wellconducted business,' which, as the Court has repeatedly said, is not to be considered in determining whether rates fixed for public service corporations are confiscatory.''
The witnesses testified as to the value of the business
or the good will of the business, if their testimony can be
construed to relate to the good will rather than to the
business. Samuel L. Tedesco stated that it was a year's
net earnings (Tr. p. 188), but he also testified that if
there was no lease and it was a month to month rental
which could be stopped at any time within thirty days
notice that it would be entirely urp to the man who wanted
to risk the purchase of the business ( Tr. p. 189). Harold
Leonard stated that if there was no lease there would
be no value (Tr. pp. 203-204). The reasoning behind this
tPstimony is clearly pointed out in the decision of Justice
Cardozo in the case of ReAccounting of Grace Q. Brown
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et al., 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581, 44 A.L.R. 510, where the
court set out the elements of good will:
''Assuming for 'present purposes that the disposition of good will has not been varied by agreement, we reach the question whether there was
any good will to be dis posed of upon the facts
recited in the findings. To answer that question,
we must consider at the outset what rights would
have passed to a buyer of the good will if the
surviving partners had sold it in the course of
liquidation. ·The chief elements of value upon
any sale of a good will are, first, continuity of
place; and, second, continuity of name. People
ex rei. A. J. Johnson Co. v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70,
at page 83, 45 L.R.A. 126, 53 N .E. 685. There
may, indeed, at times be others, e.g., continuity
of organization. That element is of value in business of a complex order. Where the business is
simple, the benefits of organization are slight and
not so easily transmitted. Confining ourselves
now to the two chief elements of value, we may
assume that the buyer of this good will would
have been reasonably assured of continuity of
place. The firm offices were the same from the
beginning of the business till the death of Stephen
Brown and later. There is nothing to show that
the survivors, genuinely endeavoring to dispose
of the good will, would have been unable to deliver
possession to a buyer of the lease.''
1

In the case at bar there is no right of continuity of
location and there was no sale. Mr. and Mrs. Ostoich
owned the premises and lived in the rear thereof so that
in order to give any value to the location Mr. and Mrs.
Ostoich would have had to be willing to sell the premises
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and move their living quarters. This fact was known to
the plaintiff at the time he went into the partnership.
He knew there was no lease going to the partnership and
that at any time the defendant could have required the
removal of the business from the location. With these
facts in mind, it is clear that there could have been no
contemplation of good will being created as an asset that
might be sold or disposed of.
The only other evidence introduced to support pJaintiff's case went to the amount of beer sold, the net vrofits
made each month during the two months of the partnership's existence. Part of this evidence was based on the
income derived from the operation of pinball machines
and punch boards, which Leonard testified should not be
considered in determining the worth of the business ( Tr.
p. 200).

5. THE COURT'S FINDING NUMBER 4 IS SO INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN THAT IT
AMOUNTS TO NO FINDING AT ALL.
In Finding number 4 the court states:

'' * * * and that in addition to the aforesaid profits
and inventory the partnership business as a
profitable going business had other and additional
value and such additional value was reasonably
worth the sum of $1600.00 and of which the Defendant retained the benefit thereof to himself
and for which an accounting by the partners was
not had and distribution not made of the same.''
(Tr. 1p. 29).
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There is no finding pointing out any other property
owned by the partnership that was not divided between
the parties. What the court intended to find as having
other additional value as a going business is not disclosed. Did the court intend to find that had the partnership continued there would have been a value of $1600.00,
or did it intend to find that if defendant had been willing
to sell the premises and fixtures that over and above
their value a purchaser would have paid $1600.00, or
was it good will that the court had in mind~ Even if one
could determine what 1property the court had in mind,
where in the record is there any evidence to substantiate
the figure of $1600.00~ But one conclusion can be reached
-the court decided plaintiff should recover something
and, in order to dispose of the case, merely took an arbitrary figure and said, Mr. Defendant, that's what you owe.
CONCLUSION
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and
the case remanded with such instructions or findings as
to this court seems proper.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN & RICHARDS
BRENT T. LYNCH, JR.
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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